For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.
With the ascent of an ideology in the political realm, in the sphere of popular culture there arises a countervailing movement, especially among the young.
The Reagan and Thatcher years of the 1980s witnessed the rise of politically conscious Irish super-band U2 (now worth $5 billion, and they pay no taxes under Irish law).
During this period and the presidency of George H.W. Bush, David Letterman became popular as an anti-talk show host, with Bill Murray as his frequent anti-comedian guest.
With the election of President Bill Clinton in 1992, the pendulum swung in the opposite direction in the popular culture.
The 1990s were the glory days of radio personalities Howard Stern and Rush Limbaugh.
Theirs was not so much a conservative reaction to the Clinton era as it was a parade of outrageous political incorrectness.
Without the right people in power to serve as a counterpoint, there is the possibility that these celebrities would have remained little more than obscure but respected fringe local acts.
One finds a similar yet distinct phenomena in French political culture.
When a new ideological regime assumes power in France, there is a political reaction against it among French society’s very large and vocal population of malcontents.
For example, when conservatives govern France, the protest vote shifts toward communists, who at one time made up one-quarter of the French electorate.
The large size of the French communist party was of grave concern for the French establishment, especially in the 1960s.
A communist revolution seemed to be a real possibility by 1968.
These fears existed in the context of the the Soviet Union looming on the eastern horizon of Europe.
Against this perceived communist threat, there came to the rescue a clever, opportunistic and manipulative ultra-conservative politician, François Mitterrand.
During WW2, Mitterrand rebranded himself as a socialist and became immensely popular in France — very much the Barrack Obama of French politics.
Mitterrand thereby annihilated communism in France.
https://www.connexionfrance.com/People/Profiles/Francois-Mitterrand-France-s-first-socialist-president-who-championed-the-people-and-acted-like-a-king
Mitterrand had relatively humble origins: born to a bourgeois family in Jarnac in 1916, he initially approached dangerous political territory, flirting with the right-wing terrorist group Cagoule and working with the Vichy collaborationist regime during the Nazi occupation of France.
But his political convictions appear to have taken a decisive twist in 1943 when he joined the Resistance, serving courageously before seeking office post-war as a left-winger.
Shortly afterwards he propelled himself into the political spotlight when he secured a cabinet post under Paul Ramadier’s socialist government in the late 1940s; it was a limelight that would remain shining down on him until he died in 1996.
But he would not fulfil his ultimate ambition until 15 years before his death, securing the presidency after an alliance with the far left.
In recalling this it seems not even Mitterrand’s supporters can refute accusations of political opportunism. Mr Battut said: “He realised that the Left could get into power through an alliance with the Communist Party, who represented 20-30% of the electorate.
“He resolved to ally himself with them for this reason only.”
And yet the success of this strategy is indisputable.
Ms Pavaux-Drory said: “The left had to unite to gain power. The Common Government Programme signed with the Communist Party and the Radical Leftist Movement in 1972 allowed him to anchor the Socialist Party to the [rest of] the left and capture young and working-class voters.”
However, it is Mitterrand’s years as president that have drawn some of the sternest criticisms levelled against him.
Mr Bell said after winning the presidency he “lost interest in social transformation, and concentrated on manipulating others around him; that commentators compared, with reason, to the court of Louis XIV”.
Its electoral usefulness ended, the Communist Party was fobbed off with control of four lesser ministries, and during the next decade its support fell to around 5% of voters.
Left-leaning voters were similarly disappointed: bowing to pressures of global recession and the loss of the National Assembly to Jacques Chirac’s right-wing coalition in 1986, Mitterrand presided over austerity measures he called “a parenthesis in the history of socialism”.
The Marxist rhetoric of the 1970s was dropped for good.
Mitterrand’s equivocal ideological status during WW2 has been commented on often.
Pierre Moscovici and Jacques Attali remain skeptical of François Mitterrand’s beliefs at this time, accusing him of having at best a “foot in each camp” until he was sure who the winner would be. They noted François Mitterrand’s friendship with René Bousquet and the wreaths he was said to have placed on Pétain’s tomb in later years (see below) as examples of his ambivalent attitude.
Bousquet had originally been a radical socialist who was promoted to the highest ranks of the Vichy government, and during this time he aggressively collaborated with the German Nazis.
After the war he went into politics as a socialist, although in 1993 he was assassinated just before he was to be put on trial for crimes against humanity.
Here he is enjoying himself with his German buddies in 1943.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ren%C3%A9_Bousquet
Mitterrand was president of France from 1981 to 1995, but with the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1990, Mitterrand’s secret ultra-conservative agenda lost purpose.
Indeed, Mitterrand’s long reign created its own problems in French political culture.
The long domination of the French state by a socialist like Mitterrand created an extremist backlash just as dangerous as the perceived communist threat.
One of the consequences of Mitterrand’s pseudo-socialism was the shift of the protest vote away from communism and toward fascism.
By this logic, the potential election of the moderate Democrats Joe Biden and Kamala Harris would precipitate a shift in American political culture toward the far-right.
Importantly, this resurgent right-wing movement would not be conservative, but rather nationalist, authoritarian and populist.
That is, the USA in 2020 may be on the cusp of a much larger and more intense far-right populist insurgency.
Donald Trump was merely the appetizer.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/07/opinion/trump-biden-2020-election.html
The one truism of public opinion is that it acts thermostatically. When the government becomes more left-wing, public opinion shifts to the right (and vice versa). This is true both in aggregate, and within parties as well.
Based on this logic, Lelkes continued, “if Biden wins, the public will shift to the right. This also means that the median Democrat will also be more right than if Trump wins.” The shift would not, however, threaten the intraparty dominance of the Democratic establishment. “The hard core left,” Lelkes wrote, “will be in a weaker position.”
In the alternative setting — Trump wins and continues to push a right-wing agenda — “the public will continue on their leftward shift (which we’ve clearly seen on social issues, ACA attitudes, etc.),” Lelkes wrote. In that case, the Democratic establishment — the moderate left — “will then be in a weaker position.”
Taking into account this “thermostatic” relationship between political authority and political culture, was the nomination of Kamala Harris a mistake?
That is, would Kamala Harris as Vice President actually represent a setback for women and people of color in terms of the racist and misogynistic backlash that she would inspire?
There is a notion that there is a “glass ceiling” that prevents a given demographic (typically applied to minorities) from rising beyond a certain level in a hierarchy.
The metaphor suggests that if some brave pioneer breaks through this invisible barrier, then others from that demographic will be liberated and be able to advance their careers further.
That was obviously the case in the illustrious and groundbreaking career of the baseball legend Jackie Robinson, who led the way in integrating the sport.
But the glass ceiling metaphor might not apply in the political sphere.
As one young black man who voted for Obama and then later for Trump said, it turned out that when someone from your group gets elected president, it does not help you at all.
In the political realm, the glass ceiling metaphor is magical thinking.
It’s the tail wagging the dog.
The real driver of historical change in this case is gradual societal progress that can be difficult to discern.
This progress involves ordinary individuals changing their own behavior, and thereby transforming the social structure over the long run.
Having a national leader from a minority group is merely a symptom of that long, slow change that consists of changes in how individuals act and interact.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Figurational_sociology
What is to be done at the political level?
What would Mitterrand do?
Mitterrand would appropriate in milder form the agenda of a radical opponent.
Mitterrand might secretly recommend that Biden cloth himself in the less problematic trappings of nationalist authoritarian populism.
Indeed, President Trump has pointed out that this is precisely what Biden seems to be doing, with Biden’s “Buy American” theme.
But how exactly could “Trumpism” be rationalized and pasteurized?
More fundamentally, just what is Trumpism?
In foreign policy, it involves a scorn for alliances and an abandonment of ideals as guiding principles.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trumpism
In terms of foreign policy in the sense of Trump’s “America First“, a unilateral is preferred to multilateral policy and national interests are particularly emphasized, especially in the context of economic treaties and alliance obligations.[7] Trump has shown a disdain for Canada as well as the transatlantic partners (NATO and European Union), who have been considered the most important allies of the United States so far.[8]
That’s interesting.
George W. Bush’s neoconservatism disdained alliances.
Barrack Obama renounced idealism in foreign relations (even while celebrating idealism in his rhetoric).
In this sense, Trump’s foreign policy shares a continuity with that of his immediate predecessors, Bush the macho utopian and Obama the reflective, analytic conservative.
If there is a trend here, Biden’s foreign policy as president might end up conforming to the pattern of the past 20 years in foreign policy under Bush, Obama and Trump.
That is, whether he wants to or not, Biden may end up jettisoning much of the foreign policy that he espoused earlier in his life — a mix of realism and liberal internationalism.
What else might this new foreign policy trend look like, say, in terms of the possibility of war?
Trump promised no wars, and on this he delivered.
This helps to explain why Trump flatters and accommodates dictators (along with his desire to eventually license hotels and casinos in their countries).
Another characteristic of foreign policy is a sympathy for autocratic rulers, especially for the Russian president Vladimir Putin, whom Trump often praised even before taking office[9] and during the 2018 Russia–United States summit.[10]
That is interesting.
Trump’s foreign policy is neither idealism nor realism, but rather isolationism.
Trump’s foreign policy is oriented toward appealing to the uneducated whites who in the past relished a hawkish foreign policy, but who now want to bring all the troops home.
But how long will uneducated white Americans remain in the mood for isolationism, until random events and politicians whip up their spirits for another war?
Moreover, how do American military officers, seeped in the teachings of realism, feel about the policy of appeasing countries like Russia?
For realists, a policy of appeasement and withdrawal make war in the future more likely because it makes one’s country look weak and vulnerable.
Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia meddles in American elections and engages in other potential acts of war, which might encourage other nations to do even worse to the USA.
Likewise, in economics, Trump’s policies abandon both liberal and conservative viewpoints, and instead appeals to the economic misfortunes of uneducated whites.
Domestic growth is therefore emphasized at the expense of trade.
In terms of economic policy, Trumpism promises new jobs and more domestic investment.[11] Trump’s hard line against export surpluses of American trading partners has led to a tense situation in 2018 with mutually imposed punitive tariffs between the United States on the one hand and the European Union and China on the other.[12] Trump secures the support of his political base with a policy that strongly emphasizes nationalism, anti-elitism and criticism of globalization.
There are practical problems with establishing Trumpist policies.
First, re-industrialization is a challenging objective because the USA never de-industrialized.
Over the 25-year period since the signing of NAFTA in 1994, manufacturing output in the USA doubled.
Importantly, manufacturing has been automating since the dawn of industrialization, and the jobs are not going to come back.
Second, it is merely the rhetoric rather than the actual policies of the Trump administration that are nationalistic, anti-elitist and anti-globalist (and religious).
The Trump administration’s actual policies are in line with the secular objectives of the Republican establishment:
- extreme tax cuts for the wealthiest, and
- a perpetually booming stock market.
Trump has managed to disguise as populist policies that actually exist at the behest of the corporate elite.
Can Biden portray his own policies as populist?
First, Biden has neither the personal magnetism of Trump, nor the fealty of blindly loyal and aggressively belligerent supporters, and this puts Biden at a disadvantage.
Second, Biden — or any other politician, for that matter — could never devote themselves entirely to public relations the way that Trump has 24/7/365.
Trump seems to have no concern with or knowledge of actual policy or the functioning of government, and is purely focused on his image in the eyes of his core supporters.
Another problem for Biden is which “populism” to drape himself with.
Biden already appeals to Trumpists with his “Made In America” shtick that he seems sincere about.
But Biden also has to appeal to the so-called “progressive populists” (romantics) within his own party.
Biden has promised profound structural reform, which he probably believes in because even some establishment economists say that it is necessary at this point in history.
The problem for Biden is that “progressive populists” are idealists, and idealists are never happy with anything real.
These over-educated romantics are very different from Trump’s populist base, and it would be difficult to appeal simultaneously to these two wings of two opposed parties.
Moreover, even in the “progressive populist” wing of the Democratic Party, there is a deep division between the supporters of Bernie Sanders and those of Elizabeth Warren.
If the Sanders and Warren crowds won’t compromise with one another, how would they reconcile themselves at length with Biden — much less with elements of right-wing populism?
Again, what is to be done?
Mitterrand’s ability to disguise himself politically should be a source of inspiration.
In America today, one of the great masters of disguise is Elon Musk.
Musk is committed to combating global warming.
Ideally, everybody should drive an electric car to limit greenhouse gases.
Europe is making progress in that direction.
But Americans don’t want to drive a boring EV that is to them just a big golf cart for hippies.
American automobile manufacturers know that, so they focus on building bigger and bigger trucks and SUVs.
Elon Musk figured out that there are some Americans who might drive an EV if it was was a luxury sports car.
Musk disguises his boring environmentalist motives behind glamor.
When Trump was elected, Musk reached out to Trump.
Musk seemed to think that the Trump administration could have promoted renewable energy behind a nationalist policy of energy security.
After all, that is what happened in 2008, when oil prices almost reached $150 a barrel.
With honorable intentions, conservative politicians embraced “energy independence”, and pushed for renewable energy investment.
At the time, there seemed to be focus on biofuels, in particular, on corn-based ethanol as a substitute for gasoline, although a decade later solar and wind have become dominant.
Historically, biofuels like corn-based ethanol can be problematic because the energy balance is negative or only marginally positive, requiring roughly equivalent petroleum inputs.
Biofuels can therefore have a reputation for being a form of “greenwashing”, as well as being a sneaky farm subsidy championed by conservative politicians who publicly eschew subsidies.
Interestingly, Americans have gotten a case of amnesia since 2008, and now imagine that this mix of patronage and energy independence was actually meant to combat climate change.
Elon Musk wanted Trump take inspiration from this turn of events since 2008.
That is, Musk would encourage Trump to push for an overt program of energy independence that would have had the intended effect of curtailing climate change.
In this light, Biden would have to reconcile at least two energy policy agendas:
- the Green New Deal that appeals to romantics in the Democratic Party, and
- an Elon Musk-type energy independence agenda that would have the same goals as the Green New Deal, but marketed to a conservative and populist audience.
All of the above touches on yet dares not address the big question which is the proverbial elephant in the room that everyone pretends does not exist:
Is the populist Trump agenda really such a bad thing?
Or is the problem, as Steve Bannon lamented, that Trump abandoned that agenda on the day that he was elected and only delivered on his promises in false, superficial form?
This question is to be asked from various points of view and multiple ideologies.
Again, take the perspective of Elon Musk.
Idiosyncratically, Elon Musk seems both a libertarian in his own life and a progressive who believes in rational societal management, and not a populist.
Musk might think that Trump’s gutting of Trumpism was a lost opportunity to hyper-modernize the economy.
From this perspective, four crucial years were tragically wasted.
