Saturday, March 26, 2016

The exponential nature of change and peak demand for oil*

There is a famous quote from Ernest Hemingway that bankruptcy happens "Gradually and then suddenly."

That could well describe the aging process. The process of erosion seems at first to be incremental, but later proves to be exponential.

More optimistically, this is also how progress happens. Technological change tends to be exponential.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accelerating_change

In futures studies and the history of technology, accelerating change is a perceived increase in the rate of technological change throughout history, which may suggest faster and more profound change in the future and it may or may not be accompanied by equally profound social and cultural change.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accelerating_change#Kurzweil.27s_The_Law_of_Accelerating_Returns

In his 1999 book The Age of Spiritual Machines Kurzweil proposed "The Law of Accelerating Returns", according to which the rate of change in a wide variety of evolutionary systems (including but not limited to the growth of technologies) tends to increase exponentially.[7] He gave further focus to this issue in a 2001 essay entitled "The Law of Accelerating Returns".[8] In it, Kurzweil, after Moravec, argued for extending Moore's Law to describe exponential growth of diverse forms of technological progress. Whenever a technology approaches some kind of a barrier, according to Kurzweil, a new technology will be invented to allow us to cross that barrier. He cites numerous past examples of this to substantiate his assertions. He predicts that such paradigm shifts have and will continue to become increasingly common, leading to "technological change so rapid and profound it represents a rupture in the fabric of human history." He believes the Law of Accelerating Returns implies that a technological singularity will occur before the end of the 21st century, around 2045. The essay begins:
 An analysis of the history of technology shows that technological change is exponential, contrary to the common-sense 'intuitive linear' view. So we won't experience 100 years of progress in the 21st century—it will be more like 20,000 years of progress (at today's rate). The 'returns,' such as chip speed and cost-effectiveness, also increase exponentially. There's even exponential growth in the rate of exponential growth. Within a few decades, machine intelligence will surpass human intelligence, leading to the Singularity—technological change so rapid and profound it represents a rupture in the fabric of human history. The implications include the merger of biological and nonbiological intelligence, immortal software-based humans, and ultra-high levels of intelligence that expand outward in the universe at the speed of light.
 According to Kurzweil, since the beginning of evolution, more complex life forms have been evolving exponentially faster, with shorter and shorter intervals between the emergence of radically new life forms, such as human beings, who have the capacity to engineer (intentionally to design with efficiency) a new trait which replaces relatively blind evolutionary mechanisms of selection for efficiency. By extension, the rate of technical progress amongst humans has also been exponentially increasing, as we discover more effective ways to do things, we also discover more effective ways to learn, i.e. language, numbers, written language, philosophy, scientific method, instruments of observation, tallying devices, mechanical calculators, computers, each of these major advances in our ability to account for information occur increasingly close together. Already within the past sixty years, life in the industrialized world has changed almost beyond recognition except for living memories from the first half of the 20th century. This pattern will culminate in unimaginable technological progress in the 21st century, leading to a singularity. Kurzweil elaborates on his views in his books The Age of Spiritual Machines and The Singularity Is Near.







For example, the increase of the percentage of electric vehicles purchased tends to double over similar time periods. For example, it might take ten years for the number of EVs purchased by the general public to increase from 1% to 2%. So it would also take ten years for the number of EVs to expand from 2% to 4%, and from 4% to 8%. It would also take ten years, by that measure, for the number of EVs to increase from 25% to 50%, and from 50% to 100%.

This would explain the new optimism of Al Gore.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/science/the-new-optimism-of-al-gore.html?_r=0
Investment in renewable energy sources like wind and solar is skyrocketing as their costs plummet. ... Experts predicted in 2000 that wind generated power worldwide would reach 30 gigawatts; by 2010, it was 200 gigawatts, and by last year it reached nearly 370, or more than 12 times higher. Installations of solar power would add one new gigawatt per year by 2010, predictions in 2002 stated. It turned out to be 17 times that by 2010 and 48 times that amount last year.
In 1980, one shows, consultants for AT&T projected that 900,000 cellphones might be sold by 2000. In fact, there were 109 million by then.
Same is true with solar power.

http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/The-U.S.-Solar-Market-Now-One-Million-Installations-Strong
Sometime around the end of February, the millionth solar installation came on-line in the United States -- a milestone that says as much about where the solar industry is going as it does about how far the industry has come.

“It took us 40 years to get to 1 million installations, and it will take us only two years to get to 2 million,” said Dan Whitten, vice president of communications at the Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA). “This is a time to mark when the solar industry started to accelerate at warp speed.”

At the end of 2015, the U.S. solar market hit a total capacity of 27 gigawatts. That represents just 1 percent of the current U.S. electricity mix, but it could triple to 3 percent by 2020. This year alone, the U.S. solar market is projected to grow 119 percent, which represents an additional 16 gigawatts of new installed capacity and more than double the record-breaking 7.3 gigawatts added in 2015.




https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffusion_of_innovations


Diffusion of innovations is a theory that seeks to explain how, why, and at what rate new ideas and technology spread. Everett Rogers, a professor of communication studies, popularized the theory in his book Diffusion of Innovations; the book was first published in 1962, and is now in its fifth edition (2003).[1] Rogers argues that diffusion is the process by which an innovation is communicated over time among the participants in a social system. The origins of the diffusion of innovations theory are varied and span multiple disciplines.







Friday, March 18, 2016

Image and substance: The three periods of the American presidency*

The improbable rise of Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential race illustrates a trend that I think started with the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980: The popular legitimacy of minor celebrities in the highest ranks of politics. Up until recently, this was really very unthinkable in the USA.

Perhaps this represents the third period of 'presidential personalities' in the USA.
In the first period, there were politicians who obsessed over their public image, but they more than lived up to this image.

Washington and Lincoln have had books written about their preoccupation with their persona. Yet, one of the hallmarks of these leaders is that they delivered the greatness that they earlier advertised. Two of the last leaders of this long period were FDR and Truman. FDR, a man of great charm and charisma from the upper classes, was partially paralyzed from polio, but this was hidden from the public; but he really was the strong and intelligent leader, both pragmatic and visionary, that he "pretended" to be in public. His successor, Harry Truman, a hat salesman from Missouri, was in some sense the anti-FDR. If he carefully cultivated the public image of the tough little guy who did not put up with B.S., he also happened to more than live up to that image. (His last name points so blatantly to his genuineness -- a "true man" -- that it seems like something out of a novel, a confection of the ordinary that is simultaneously fictitious yet authentic.)

Again, in this long period, classic American leaders very carefully and consciously put forward an idealized image of themselves, but in reality they remarkably lived up to that image with a severe discipline.

In the second period of American presidential history, there is a divergence of public image and substance, yet the substance is still there and quite remarkable.

The first of these presidents was Dwight Eisenhower. Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in WW2, Eisenhower had the personality of a high-ranking military officer: disciplined, intellectually sharp, shrewd, personally ambitious, at times hot tempered. But the (false) image that he displayed to the American public during the dark depths of the Cold War in the 1950s was one of re-assurance: the kindly, easy-going grandfather who spent more time at the golf course than in the office.

Here we find the formation of a very different pattern: a leader of great substance who cloaks himself in the mantle of lesser celebrity.

the Kennedys (the President, and his brother Robert, who was then Attorney General) were actually not in favor of the civil rights movement. At all. They were suspicious of it, and saw it as a dangerous distraction from the very real and imminent possibility of nuclear war. In fact, when JFK spoke the famous words at his inauguration "Ask not what your country can do for you...", he was directly challenging the civil rights movement.

Johnson might not have been worrying directly about the possibility of domestic chaos from demonstrations leading to international conflict. But he was very conscious of how the civil rights movement would undermine the Democratic Party. Hence his creation of the Great Society program, which was aimed at a broad audience. LBJ was more of a pragmatist in introducing such legislation than we might think.



The dominant anxiety within the Kennedy and Johnson administrations was the fear of nuclear war. That seems remote today, but in the documentary "The Fog of War", former defense secretary Robert McNamara posits that nuclear war was not only possible, but inevitable, and it was a fluke that it did not happen during the Cold War. (WW2 was a nuclear war, albeit one-sided. We forget that nuclear war has already happened probably because it happened in Japan, and not to white people. If two cities in Germany had been nuked, attitudes toward nuclear weapons among the great powers might have been quite different.) 

The civil rights movement really revved up in the 1950s (e.g., Rosa Parks and the bus boycott in Alabama in 1955). This was part of a general reaction to WW2 and against fascism, and it involves the resulting de-colonization process that was happening globally in the post-war era. But it also involved economic changes. (Britain and France were no longer powerful; also, in the bus strike in Alabama, blacks carpooled instead of taking the bus. Blacks owned cars! This showed the growing economic power of blacks as the US was booming.) But this was also during the Cold War, and so there was a sense within the establishment that civil rights was a peripheral concern. 

Television changed that. When blacks were attacked by police in the southeastern US, all Americans could see on TV that one region of their country was essentially a vast prison camp. 

But foreigners could also see this. Europeans up until then had no idea that the US was segregated. The US was the champion of the process of de-colonization -- which increased American power globally (re-colonization). The new awareness of apartheid in the US cast American democracy in a new light, making the US look like a giant version of South Africa. 

In a sense, the US was now at a disadvantage in the Cold War because of the exposure of American reality on global TV screens. (Likewise, the Soviet Union was discredited when the Soviets crushed the Hungarian revolt in 1958.) In particular, the de-colonizing countries (now called "developing" countries) were up for grabs between the American and Soviet spheres of influence. 

Here's an example of a future communist leader of Ethiopia (Mengistu) being radicalized while receiving military trained in the US for six months (in Maryland) during the 1960s.


At this point, civil rights goes from something the establishment avoids in the face of the Cold War, to becoming an imperative because of the Cold War. 

Here is the congressional voting pattern for the Civil Rights Act of 1964.


The Republican Party had been the party of the north since the Civil War, just as the Democratic Party had been that of the South. That has reversed since the 1970s. The point is that by the mid-1960s, the establishment in both parties was all in for civil rights. The reasons for this, however, were more complicated than the pious liberal propaganda that we are now socialized into (political correctness).

One curiosity is the way that the Vietnam War was lumped together in the American consciousness with the civil rights movement. World War Two is seen as the "good war" and the Vietnam War is somehow seen as the "bad war". All the "bad things" people think about in terms of civil rights (racism, imperialism, etc.) were projected onto the Vietnam conflict.

But the Vietnam War was not so different from the Korean War, which did not incite protest. The divergent responses might have something to do with television coverage, or so it is now widely assumed. People are horrified with combat when it is brought into their living rooms.

But that does not seem to be true. When American movie audiences during WW2 were shown clips of combat and quizzed afterwards, it was found that viewing the violence of war only increased their commitment to fighting Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. So context is important. People felt (rightly) that WW2 was a war for national survival, but they were less sure about the wars in Korea and Vietnam (understandably). 

The casualty rate was crucial; 33,000 American troops died in Korea, and 58,000 died in Vietnam, so the latter war drew more protest. In dubious wars, public resistance is directly proportional to the fatality rate; but against a powerful enemy (Germany, Japan) who is able to and desires to destroy one's homeland, the fatality rate is inversely related to the will to fight, that is, as more men die, the will to fight increases. (This is why the French have their Foreign Legion, and the Americans now rely on mercenary forces like Blackwater: it is a way of hiding fatalities during questionable wars, although it makes little military or financial sense.)

So, the point is that what most people think of "the 1960s" is basically mythical. These three issues of the era -- the civil rights movement, the Vietnam war, the role of television -- are each poorly understood, even distorted, and they are sort of bundled together in the national consciousness (kind of the way sub-prime mortgages and other securities garbage were bundled together and sold on the stock market not so long ago). 



Wednesday, March 16, 2016

Code switching and ideological misrecognition and the 2016 US presidential elections

It takes a while for a national trauma to sink in and register.

The novel "All Quiet on the Western Front" was published in 1929, eleven years after the end of WW1.

In 1924, six years after the close of that war, "Storm of Steel" was published in Germany, portraying war not as tragedy and a fraud but as a great, mysterious, elemental force to be experienced and survived.

In 1978, the movies "Coming Home" and "The Deer Hunter" came out, five years after the United States withdrew from Vietnam. In 1979, "Apocalypse Now" came out.

In 1982, "Rambo: First Blood" came out, a very different kind of Vietnam movie. 

In some respects, the first "Rambo" movie echoes a certain postwar sentiment that has always been marginalized in the media. While other Vietnam movies portrayed the horror of war, and later "Rambo" sequel glamorized combat, "First Blood" reflected an alienation with a corrupt civilian life that one finds in the American film noire of the post-WW2 period, into the 1950s. War was a hardship, but honorable, with genuine camaraderie, and promotion was based on talent and effort, not connections and inherited status. 

Speaking of nostalgia, here's an update on the classic Marxist concept of "ideological misrecognition". For Marx, people need to be enlightened about their exploitation so that they can cast off the false beliefs of the status quo and embrace revolution. Later "critical theorists" identified misrecognition as active propaganda and not just an effect of exploitation. More recently, misrecognition has been understood as nostalgia for a lost object which is actually fictitious (e.g., an idealized vision of a pre-colonial order in the Third World).

That sounds a lot like "First Blood". 


But it also sounds a lot like Donald Trump talking about ma
king American "great again."

There is the question of the exact psychological dynamic of how misrecognition works, as well as the question of whether there is ever any real liberation from misrecognition, or if all cognition is misrecognition.

There is an anthropological and psychological mystery of why American Indians, when they watch movies about the "wild west", tend to root for the cowboys and not the Indians.

Basically, the brain interprets events into an internal language. So when American Indians watch a western, they perceive the characters in the movie in term of the Good Guys versus the Bad Guys, not in terms of settlers versus aboriginals. The brain does not absorb the literal truth of the movie, but rather conforms to the narrative elements of the story.

The same thing is true with Donald Trump supporters. Seven years ago there was a total meltdown in the real-estate and financial sectors, which was basically due to arrogance, corruption, and ignorance that pervaded the political and economic realms. At an unconscious level, this disturbs Trump supporters. But because of their authoritarian tendencies, they cannot consciously rebel against the elite who make the (corrupt) policies and rules. So they blame foreigners and rule breakers for America's problems. The one group of foreign rule-breakers that they are familiar with in daily life is migrant workers from Mexico. So in their minds, this group becomes America's greatest problem (and a perfect metaphor for globalization).

Bernie Sanders followers, who are more educated and less authoritarian, are vastly more clear-eyed about the flaws in the American political and economic system. But they have their own distortion of economic reality. They claim to be concerned about growing income inequality in the United States.

But is income inequality really growing? Bill Gates is the wealthiest man in the world today, with a worth of $80 billion; he was born into wealth and went to the best schools. One century ago, John D. Rockefeller was worth $340 billion and Andrew Carnegie $310 billion; they were both born into modest circumstances (in fact, into poverty, by today's standards). By historical standards, income inequality has been shrinking, but upward mobility has been stifled. And historically, income inequality (Equality of Condition) never really bothered Americans, American life was always about upward mobility (Equality of Opportunity).

But the followers of Sanders don't use the less rhetorically appealing battle cry that "It is becoming more difficult to move up in the world." Rather, they use the stark language of "inequality" from the civil rights movement -- even though the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was really limited to equality before the laws (Equality of Opportunity), not income equality. Sanders supporters want to move up in the world, but they cannot admit it, not publicly, and not even to themselves.

Friday, March 11, 2016

Human social cognition as two systems (autism and Neanderthals)

Here's a very fascinating lecture by a psychologist who argues that humans have two distinct but interacting systems for social cognition, one for understanding agency (instrumental manipulation of things in the world by people) and the other for understanding other people's minds (motives and intentions). (A parallel would be how humans have two interacting systems for dealing with math and numbers.) 

This has clear ramifications for understanding autism. Autism might be a 'defect' in the 'mind reading' system. However, in mild form, it would have clear advantages in terms of technical problem solving. 

One might expect that having the counterpart deficiency -- specifically, poorly understanding agency yet deeply understanding the motives of others -- would manifest itself as a surfeit of social and emotional intelligence, and would be found especially in women (the way autism is more often found in men). But it would not be understood in our society as a "syndrome", the way Asperger's is, but rather as simply being "not-so-smart". Which is both unfair and untrue! And biased against women and their intuition!

In this Wikipedia article on social cognition, there is no mention of a dual system of social perception divided between agency and empathy. This might suggest that it is a relatively new notion. 

However, it seems that in the relatively long history of psychology there have been dual process theories of cognition in many fields. 

In psychology, a dual process theory provides an account of how a phenomenon can occur in two different ways, or as a result of two different processes. Often, the two processes consist of an implicit (automatic), unconscious process and an explicit (controlled), conscious process. Verbalized explicit processes or attitudes and actions may change with persuasion or education; though implicit process or attitudes usually take a long amount of time to change with the forming of new habits. Dual process theories can be found in social, personality, cognitive, and clinical psychology. It has also been linked with economics via prospect theory and behavioral economics.

The earliest conception of a dual process cognition seems to go back at least as far as the American philosopher William James.

The foundations of dual process theory likely comes from William James. He believed that there were two different kinds of thinking: associative and true reasoning. James theorized that empirical thought was used for things like art and design work. For James, images and thoughts would come to mind of past experiences, providing ideas of comparison or abstractions. He claimed that associative knowledge was only from past experiences describing it as “only reproductive”. James believed that true reasoning was useful for “unprecedented situations” in which using reasoning to overcome obstacles such as navigation could be overcome with reasoning power of being able to use a map.

I am slightly familiar with the writings of the economist Daniel Kahneman from his book, "Thinking, Fast and Slow". 

Daniel Kahneman provided further interpretation by differentiating the two styles of processing more, calling them intuition and reasoning in 2003. Intuition (or system 1), similar to associative reasoning, was determined to be fast and automatic, usually with strong emotional bonds included in the reasoning process. Kahneman said that this kind of reasoning was based on formed habits and very difficult to change or manipulate. Reasoning (or system 2) was slower and much more volatile, being subject to conscious judgments and attitudes.[6]

Kahneman distinguishes the two cognitive systems.

System 1System 2
Unconscious ReasoningConscious Reasoning
ImplicitExplicit
AutomaticControlled
Low EffortHigh Effort
Large CapacitySmall Capacity
RapidSlow
Default ProcessInhibitory
AssociativeRule-Based
ContextualizedAbstract
Domain SpecificDomain General
Evolutionarily OldEvolutionarily Recent
NonverbalLinked to language
Includes recognition, perception, orientationIncludes rule following, comparisons, weighing of options
Modular CognitionFluid Intelligence
Independent of working memoryLimited by working memory capacity
Non-LogicalLogical
ParallelSerial

Now, there is a real problem with Kahneman's ideas in terms of their historicity. He portrays the rational thinking system as a recent development in humans.
System 2 In Humans
System 2 is evolutionarily recent and specific to humans. It is also known as the explicit system, the rule-based system, the rational system,[10] or the analytic system.[14] It performs the more slow and sequential thinking. It is domain-general, performed in the central working memory system. Because of this, it has a limited capacity and is slower than System 1 which correlates it with general intelligence. It is known as the rational system because it reasons according to logical standards.[14] Some overall properties associated with System 2 are that it is rule-based, analytic, controlled, demanding of cognitive capacity, and slow.[10]

This sounds like a replay of the (somewhat) debunked notion of the "triune brain", which divided the human brain into the reptilian, mammalian (limbic system) sections. The current take on the triune brain model is that it is simplistic, that all of these structures have long existed in the human species and have evolved and complexified simultaneously, not in succession. 

Likewise, if there are two systems of cognition in the human brain, both are extraordinarily advanced and have been developing alongside one another for millions of years. 

(Kahneman's conception might reflect an academic bias toward valorizing rationality.)

Now for something slightly different....


One problem with this is that there is insufficient information on the occurrence of autism among black Africans, who basically have no Neanderthal ancestry. (Europeans have 4% Neanderthal DNA, and Asians around 2%.) Also, 'autism' has become a catchall label, thrown at everything, the way 'retarded' was decades ago, so it might be VERY over-diagnosed in the West.

It is interesting, though, that at one time mental retardation, especially Down's syndrome, was seen as a throwback to an earlier stage of human evolution ('mongoloidism'). The Neanderthal theory of autism seems to parallel that earlier theory. 

Let's look at a few physiological ways that Homo neanderthalensis different from and also resembled our primary line, Homo sapiens. The neanderthals probably had language. Neanderthal skeletons have big fat holes where the hypoglossal nerve runs to the throat, and where the thoracic nerve system runs to the chest. Only modern humans have those highly developed nerve systems because we extensively vocalize; but neanderthals seem to have had them as well, although the nature of neanderthal language is unknown.

They had bigger skulls than homo sapiens, although the skulls lacked the elegance of human skulls.

http://public.media.smithsonianmag.com/legacy_blog/skulls.jpg

The large brain and skull might be related to climate. Around the world (even in places like Australia, isolated from other human groups) about 20,000 year ago, the human brain began to shrink by the size of a tennis ball; this coincides with the end of the Ice Age. The neanderthal lived in colder regions, and there could be a relationship between cold climates and bigger brains unrelated to intelligence. 

The neanderthal were stockier and slightly shorter than Homo sapiens, and with shorter limbs. That also seems to be an adaptation to the cold.

Most striking, the neanderthals were not as attractive as Homo sapiens. 

We have prominent chins. They did not. Scientists are puzzled by our chins, which are unnecessary for any practical purpose. But those chins are elegant, and point to the other, less mentioned mechanism, along with natural selection, that Darwin claimed drove evolution: that would be sexual selection. This is what gave the peacock's their big plumage. It's also usually driven by the choosing power of adult females.

Here is a 2013 NOVA documentary on Neanderthals.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BTMEDQmfOLk

The anthropologists interviewed assert that Neanderthal tools are much more sophisticated than the tools used by their Homo sapien contemporaries. For instance, the flint chip tools that Neanderthals used look heavy and crude compared to the refined chips that Homo sapiens used, but were actually more useful and much more difficult to produce. Likewise, the spearheads that the Neanderthals used were glued to their bulky spears using a compound derived from birch bark; at the time of filming, scientists still could not figure out how the compound was produced. 

Here is the main tool that our Homo sapien ancestors were using for a long period of time, ranging from millions of years ago to 40,000 years ago. It's a hand axe.


But no one is sure what it is used for. In some respects, it is an all-around tool (not really strictly an axe). But some studies conclude that there is no real wear and tear on the specimens found (and there have been an abundance of specimens found). The 'hand axes' are described by archaeologists as art works that probably conferred status on the owner. So the hand axes are similar to automobiles in the 1950s and smartphones today: a very useful all-around tool that was also a status symbol. 

In a way, this superficially conforms to the Neanderthal-autism hypothesis. Technologically, the Neanderthal were actually superior to Homo sapiens. Artistically, symbolically and socially, they seem to have been quite behind Homo sapiens. To be fair, the Neanderthal lived in an especially harsh climate that would demand technological accomplishments over artistic achievements. 

But this "technology versus artistic symbolism" observation does not line up with Kahneman's distinction between (fast) intuition versus (slow) rational deliberation. Technological and symbolic development both require intuition and rationality. 
Here is an engraving found in Gorham's cave in Gibraltar, which some have interpreted to be an example of Neanderthal art dating back 39,000 year ago, based on the surrounding sediment.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gorham's_Cave#Symbolic_rock_engraving

It is a hash mark, like that in a game of tic-tac-toe. It is dated to the time when Homo sapiens first entered Europe, although Homo sapiens had not yet entered Spain. Nevertheless, some anthropologists argue that it was done by either Homo sapiens from northern Africa, or by Neanderthals who were inspired by contact with Homo sapien art.

However, it could be that Neanderthal were simply evolving artistically similarly to the way Homo sapiens did, but with a time lag of tens of thousands of years.

http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2012/06/120614-neanderthal-cave-paintings-spain-science-pike/

"If you look at the [modern human] trajectory towards art, we find shell beads, bits of ochre, and ostrich shells carved with geometric designs from about 70,000 to 100,000 years ago" in Africa, he said.


Now, at European sites, "we see that Neanderthals are following the same trajectory. We see shell beads, carved sculptures, and geometric designs on bits of bone. And now we see what might be Neanderthal art."

"It suggests that a lengthy period of geometric or abstract art ... in both Africa and Europe, preceded the emergence of figurative representations. If anything, it argues for a middle Paleolithic revolution, not an upper Paleolithic revolution."

Interestingly, there is a connection between autism and a fascination with geometric patterns.

http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=119438

Geometric cave art was later superseded by animal art. Ironically, autistic individuals often identify with animals. This emotional identification could be due to an erroneous assumption that animals are similar to autistic humans.

https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/animal-emotions/201308/do-animals-typically-think-autistic-savants

The point here is that the evolution of human art originally had a very technical aspect that grew more sophisticated, from geometric patterns to wild animals. Again, this is the dichotomy of the technical versus the symbolic, not Kahneman's dualism of intuition versus rational deliberation. And like intuition and rationality, the technical and the symbolic were evolving hand-in-hand, not one supplanting the other (despite Kahneman's assertions) -- although the technical aspects of art would have been expressed first. That is, art would have developed from simple to more complex technical achievements, although symbolic meaning would have been projected onto it at the same time. (My bias is that technical achievements in art would have driven cultural and symbolic sophistication in interpreting art, but the artistic innovations were not driven by the need for more advanced forms of expression by ordinary people.)

This brings us to an interesting question: Which individuals made the first art?

The autistic inventor Temple Grandin has asserted that the first individual(s) who harnessed the making of fire were probably autistic. The same might be true of the first artists. They would have had the same unique (non-social) skills to focus on highly technical aspects of an art that their compatriots would have understood in deep symbolic terms (and in terms of social status that might have meant little to autistic individuals). 

Back to the original issue of the dual system of social cognition

Individual humans who suffer an impairment to the 'theory of mind' or 'mind reading' system of social cognition might develop their agency system of social cognition to a greater degree, with an emphasis on a technical understanding of things. They would be the pioneers of tool making (whereas the 'neurotypical' or normal tool makers who copy them would be more concerned with status), but also innovators in the technical aspects of art.

It could be that the Neanderthal had such an impairment to their 'mind reading' abilities, hence their remarkable technical achievements and their relative paucity of accomplishments in symbolic culture. 

But it could be that the Neanderthals, more subject to the harshest aspects of the Ice Age, simply invested more of their efforts into technology than art.

And maybe it is still like that. Here is a BMW commercial about a Dutch artist, Theo Jansen. 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lXwSwQ2HKZg

Here is a BMW commercial from Italy.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UlNvJVSKZEQ











Saturday, March 5, 2016

Ideologies as self-organizing systems*

Self-organizing systems are understood to consist of lower-level component parts that interact to produce  system-wide order. "Self-organization is a process where some form of overall order or coordination arises out of the local interactions between smaller component parts of an initially disordered system."

One point of interest is how simple rules or limited stimuli and input at the local level produce the complex behavior of the whole system.

A classic example of this would be the simple reactions of fish within a school. As a body, they move with dazzling dexterity and apparent coordination.


Could ideologies provide such simple rules? From these rules, complex societal outcomes through local interactions would arise?

Perhaps one ideology would supply the rules. But could the basic principles of several ideologies supply the rules simultaneously?

(Ideologies understood as such would be explicit normative systems that could be imposed, as distinct from the standard, popular notion of cultures as tacit, unconscious systems of values and attitudes.)

Within the liberal tradition, libertarian thought offers a minimalist role for government as the enforcer of strictly proscriptive or prohibitive rights that protect individuals from one another and from the state, as opposed to the prescriptive rights found in socialistic ideologies that seek to solve social problems. 
Libertarianism (Latin: liber, "free") is a political philosophy that upholds liberty as its principal objective. Libertarians seek to maximize autonomy and freedom of choice, emphasizing political freedom, voluntary association, and the primacy of individual judgment.
Some libertarians advocate laissez-faire capitalism and strong private property rights,[3] such as in land, infrastructure, and natural resources. Others, notably libertarian socialists,[4] seek to abolish capitalism and private ownership of the means of production in favor of their common or cooperative ownership and management.[5][6] An additional line of division is between minarchists and anarchists. While minarchists think that a minimal centralized government is necessary, anarchists propose to completely eliminate the state.
The term libertarianism originally referred to a philosophical belief in free will but later became associated with anti-state socialism and Enlightenment-influenced[9][10] political movements critical of institutional authority believed to serve forms of social domination and injustice. While it has generally retained its earlier political usage as a synonym for either social or individualist anarchism through much of the world, in the United States it has since come to describe pro-capitalist economic liberalism more so than radical, anti-capitalist egalitarianism. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, libertarianism is defined as the moral view that agents initially fully own themselves and have certain moral powers to acquire property rights in external things.[11] As individualist opponents of social liberalism embraced the label and distanced themselves from the word liberal, American writers, political parties, and think tanks adopted the word libertarian to describe advocacy of capitalist free market economics and a night-watchman state.
The night-watchman state deserves a closer look.
A night-watchman state, or a minimal state, is variously defined by sources. In the strictest sense, it is a form of government in political philosophy where the state's only legitimate function is the protection of individuals from assault, theft, breach of contract, and fraud, and the only legitimate governmental institutions are the military, police, and courts. In the broadest sense, it also includes various civil service and emergency-rescue departments (such as the fire departments), prisons, the executive, the judiciary, and the legislatures as legitimate government functions.[1][2][3]
Advocacy of a night-watchman state is known as minarchism. Minarchists argue that the state has no right to use its monopoly on the use of force to interfere with free transactions between people, and see the state's sole responsibility as ensuring that transactions between private individuals are free. As such, minarchists generally believe in a laissez-faire approach to the economy. The rationale for this belief may be economic prosperity, moral limitations on the use of state force, or both.
Libertarian socialism is likewise an exotic term.
Libertarian socialism (sometimes called social anarchism,[1][2] left-libertarianism[3][4] and socialist libertarianism[5]) is a group of anti-authoritarian[6] political philosophies inside the socialist movement that rejects socialism as centralized state ownership and control of the economy,[7] as well as the state itself.[8] It criticizes wage labour relationships within the workplace,[9] instead emphasizing workers' self-management of the workplace[8] and decentralized structures of political organization,[10] asserting that a society based on freedom and equality can be achieved through abolishing authoritarian institutions that control certain means of production and subordinate the majority to an owning class or political and economic elite.[11] Libertarian socialists generally place their hopes in decentralized means of direct democracy and federal or confederal associations[12] such as libertarian municipalism, citizens' assemblies, trade unions, and workers' councils.[13][14] All of this is generally done within a general call for libertarian[15] and voluntary human relationships[16] through the identification, criticism, and practical dismantling of illegitimate authority in all aspects of human life.[17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24]
Past and present political philosophies and movements commonly described as libertarian socialist include anarchism (especially anarchist communism, anarchist collectivism, anarcho-syndicalism,[25] and mutualism[26]) as well as autonomism, communalism, participism, revolutionary syndicalism, and libertarian Marxist philosophies such as council communism and Luxemburgism;[27] as well as some versions of "utopian socialism"[28] and individualist anarchism.
The libertarian perspective is of great interest because it is minimalist political philosophy and, as explained above, minimalism would be a feature of a self-organizing system. (In fact, libertarianism is the ideology of preference in Silicon Valley because engineers consider the simplest solutions to be the best solutions.)

However, libertarian socialism confounds the conflation in the popular mind of socialism with state socialism, and in this way libertarian socialism might have a complicating influence if it were adopted widely (cooperatives would be tasked with what are now considered typical governmental and corporate functions).

Complicating things further, libertarian socialism can be seen as one stream in the long tradition of socialism.

Looking at a school of thought or an ideology as a tradition is not necessarily a conservative move. Hans-Georg Gadamer in particular looked upon tradition as a creative starting-point, a provocation.
“Tradition,” like “prejudice,” is a term Gadamer develops beyond its everyday meaning. To affirm, as Gadamer does, that one can never escape from one’s tradition, does not mean he is insisting we endorse all traditions writ large. Gadamer is not espousing a conservative approach to tradition that blindly affirms the whole of a tradition and leaves one without recourse to critique it. Critics like Habermas and Ricoeur have faulted Gadamer for failing to insist on a critical response to tradition. These criticisms miss the mark for two reasons. First, accepting the fact that we can never entirely reflect oneself out of tradition does not mean that one cannot change and question one’s tradition. His point is that in as much as tradition serves as the condition of one’s knowledge, the background that instigates all inquiry, one can never start from a tradition-free place. A tradition is what gives one a question or interest to begin with. Second, all successful efforts to enliven a tradition require changing it so as to make it relevant for the current context. To embrace a tradition is to make it one’s own by altering it. A passive acknowledgment of a tradition does not allow one to live within it. One must apply the tradition as one’s own. In other words, the importance of the terms, “prejudice” and “tradition,” for Gadamer’s hermeneutics lies in the way they indicate the active nature of understanding that produces something new. Tradition hands down certain interests, prejudices, questions, and problems, that incite knowledge. Tradition is less a conserving force than a provocative one. Even a revolution, Gadamer notes, is a response to the tradition that nonetheless makes use of that very same tradition. Here we can also perceive the Hegelian influences on Gadamer to the extent that even a rejection of some elements of the tradition relies on the preservation of other elements, which are then understood (that is, taken up) in new ways. Gadamer desires not to affirm a blind and passive imitation of tradition, but to show how making tradition our own means a critical and creative application of it.
Of course, there are conservative notions of tradition, most obviously like those of the political theorist Michael Oakeshott. Above all else, Oakeshott seems opposed to grand political schemes.
Oakeshott's opposition to what he considered Utopian political projects is summed by his use of the analogy (possibly borrowed from the Marquess of Halifax, a 17th-century English author whom he admired) of a ship of state which has "neither starting-place nor appointed destination...[and where] the enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel".
Interestingly, this is a very relativistic, even nihilistic criticism of Utopian tendencies, so different from populist brands of conservatism that one finds in the United States, which so often insist on grounding themselves in teleologies or origin stories of a religious nature. For Oakeshott, to be conservative is to be skeptical of what might be described as an almost mystical, fantasmagoric attitude toward political change.
In his essay "On Being Conservative" (1956), Oakeshott explained what he regarded as the conservative disposition: "To be conservative ... is to prefer the familiar to the unknown, to prefer the tried to the untried, fact to mystery, the actual to the possible, the limited to the unbounded, the near to the distant, the sufficient to the superabundant, the convenient to the perfect, present laughter to utopian bliss."
This is seems more like a contrast of realism versus radicalism, not conservatism with any other ideology. (For example, moderates and liberals in the US are not typically given to the rhetoric of "utopian bliss".) Conservatism might be associated with realism in terms of the attitude of caution towards change and a deep skepticism of idealism, but the deeper core of the conservative attitude would be a desire for continuity. Continuity and change, importantly, are not mutually exclusive when the change is gradual and moderate. Oakeshott distinguishes between political orientations that seek to promote the good versus those that merely seek to prevent the bad.
In his posthumously-published The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, Oakeshott describes enterprise and civil association in different terms. Here, an enterprise association is seen as based in a fundamental faith in human ability to ascertain and grasp some universal "good" (i.e. the Politics of Faith), and civil association is seen as based in a fundamental scepticism about human ability to either ascertain or achieve this good (i.e. the Politics of Scepticism). Oakeshott considers power (especially technological power) as a necessary prerequisite for the Politics of Faith, because a) it allows people to believe they can achieve something great (e.g. something universally good), and b) it allows them to implement the policies necessary to achieve their goal. The Politics of Scepticism, on the other hand, rests on the idea that government should concern itself with preventing bad things from happening rather than enabling ambiguously good events.
Oakeshott employs the analogy of the adverb to describe the kind of restraint law involves. For example, the law against murder is not a law against killing as such, but only a law against killing "murderously". Or, a more trivial example, the law does not dictate that I have a car, but if I do, I must drive it on the same side of the road as everybody else. This contrasts with the rules of enterprise association in which those actions required by the governing are made compulsory for all.
Interestingly, Oakeshott's Politics of Faith corresponds to the classical tradition of political philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, the Church). Traditional political theorists conceive society as an organic whole, and promote a life of virtue as one that serves the common good. More modern conceptions of the political realm (Hobbes, Locke), in contrast, describe society as a product of a social contract between autonomous, self-interested individuals who seek mutual protection from chaos and strife. This modern attitude corresponds with Oakeshott's Politics of Skepticism.

Back to the socialist tradition. What is socialism?
Socialism is a range of economic and social systems characterised by social ownership and democratic control of the means of production; as well as the political ideologies, theories, and movements that aim at their establishment. Social ownership may refer to forms of public, cooperative, or collective ownership; to citizen ownership of equity; or to any combination of these. Although there are many varieties of socialism and there is no single definition encapsulating all of them, social ownership is the common element shared by its various forms.
Socialism is all about sharing. But there are different kinds of sharing. "Socialism can be divided into both non-market and market forms." Non-market socialism sounds like a sophisticated  system of bartering, whereas market socialism retains the use of money. "In addition to the debate over markets and planning, the varieties of socialism differ in their form of social ownership, how management is to be organized within productive institutions, and the role of the state in constructing socialism."
Core dichotomies associated with these concerns include reformism versus revolutionary socialism, and state socialism versus libertarian socialism. Socialist politics has been both centralist and decentralized; internationalist and nationalist in orientation; organized through political parties and opposed to party politics; at times overlapping with trade unions and at other times independent of, and critical of, unions; and present in both industrialized and developing countries. While all tendencies of socialism consider themselves democratic, the term "democratic socialism" is often used to highlight its advocates' high value for democratic processes and political systems and usually to draw contrast to other socialist tendencies they may perceive to be undemocratic in their approach.
 How is this different from communism? Communism is associated with an extreme egalitarianism.
In political and social sciences, communism (from Latin communis, "common, universal")[1][2] is a social, political, and economic ideology and movement whose ultimate goal is the establishment of the communist society, which is a socioeconomic order structured upon the common ownership of the means of production and the absence of social classes, money,[3][4] and the state.
The different variants of 'communism' maintain a similar critique, that of class exploitation.
Communism includes a variety of schools of thought, which broadly include Marxism, anarchism (anarchist communism), and the political ideologies grouped around both. All these hold in common the analysis that the current order of society stems from its economic system, capitalism, that in this system, there are two major social classes: the working class – who must work to survive, and who make up a majority of society – and the capitalist class – a minority who derive profit from employing the proletariat, through private ownership of the means of production (the physical and institutional means with which commodities are produced and distributed), and that political, social and economic conflict between these two classes will trigger a fundamental change in the economic system, and by extension a wide-ranging transformation of society. The primary element which will enable this transformation, according to this analysis, is the social ownership of the means of production.
After this very brief overview of several ideological traditions, it's important to distinguish between the ideology and the attitude toward tradition itself. From the Wikipedia article on 'conservatism':
There is no single set of policies that are universally regarded as conservative because the meaning of conservatism depends on what is considered traditional in a given place and time. Thus conservatives from different parts of the world—each upholding their respective traditions—may disagree on a wide range of issues. Edmund Burke, an 18th-century politician who opposed the French Revolution but supported the American Revolution, is credited as one of the main theorists of conservatism in Britain in the 1790s.[4] According to Quintin Hogg, the chairman of the British Conservative Party in 1959, "Conservatism is not so much a philosophy as an attitude, a constant force, performing a timeless function in the development of a free society, and corresponding to a deep and permanent requirement of human nature itself."
Every tradition has its conservatives and its revolutionaries. In the communist tradition, Stalin was a conservative realist opposed to the revolutionary idealism of Trotsky. Like Oakeshott, Edmund Burke was a conservative realist within the modernist tradition associated with liberal individualism.

The assertion here is, We can distinguish between the formal ideology and the attitude associated with it, even though that attitude is actually found throughout the ideological spectrum.

What about fascism? Can we distinguish between the fascist ideology and the spirit of fascism? If so, can the spirit of fascism be found in other ideologies?


[[[[National Socialism or fascism might be an ideology, but as Umberto Eco pointed out, there is an ur-fascism or spirit of fascism present in all times and places

[[[[what is NatSoc? What is the spirit of fascism? (Related to an 'authoritarian personality', which in a liberal society is often the most rigidly liberal and politically correct person.)

[[[fascism has the spirit of excess (Hitler would always choose the most extreme option or suggestion.) One example of the need to out-do others would be leftism in the 1960s ("Mao-er than thao"), or postmodernism in the 1980s, or rap music in the 1990s, or the Republican party in 2016.
 
[[[["more is better", which is the mentality of the working class, present in colonial American in an emphasis on quantity and materialism. But it is not just that consumption that is excessive with Americans, there is something else.

[[[[Americans are very moderate in the public realm, but in private they veer toward excess. "The dark night of fascism is always about to touch the ground in America, but it only ever happens in Europe."

[[[[[Fascism celebrates purity and unity, but projects inner deficiencies outward, and externalizes aggression. The puritanism of Americans tends to be inward and individual, and the aggression is channeled into work and recreation.